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EQUALITY AND ACCESS TO CREDIT:  




Most Americans assume that debt is mainly about transaction and choice in 
a market.1 But in the United States and some other advanced economies, debt is 
much more than some isolated transactions independent of government policy. 
Debt is often what social scientists and philosophers describe as a social good, the 
distribution of which determines the life chances of individuals, children, and 
entire families. The social good aspect of debt has not been lost on governments 
and politicians. In many advanced economies and particularly in the United 
States, debt—or its converse, access to credit—is predominantly social and 
political, with extensive government involvement in deciding who gets credit and 
who does not. A substantial amount of private debt in the United States is 
subsidized or guaranteed by the federal government.2 The Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac), two government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), 
guarantee about $7 trillion in U.S. home mortgage debt, over ninety percent of 
all mortgage debt in the country.3 Even after the last financial crisis in 2008–2009, 
the U.S. federal government remains substantially involved in making the 
mortgage securitization market possible, which fuels the very existence of the 
thirty-year fixed rate mortgage. Extensive federal regulation of the market, 
including an array of disclosure laws, regulation of terms and transaction 
structures, and laws banning discrimination in lending, has existed for quite some 
time.4 
Institutions in American society enforce what sociologist Rachel Dwyer 
characterizes as a credit-welfare state tradeoff: subsidized debt promotes well-
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 1.  See SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4  (2011) (claiming that because the majority of government aid 
is an in-direct subsidy, many taxpayers are unaware of the significant impact the aid has on the market). 
 2.  SARAH L. QUINN, AMERICAN BONDS: HOW CREDIT MARKETS SHAPED A NATION (2019). 
 3.  Bruce Mizrach & Christopher J. Neely, Fed Intervention in the To-Be-Announced Market for 
Mortgage-Backed Securities, ECON. SYNOPSES, Apr., 2020, at 1. 
 4.  See discussion infra Part II. 
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being and social mobility in lieu of a strong set of public benefits programs.5 This 
is a precarious tradeoff, which makes people and families vulnerable. The 
tradeoff converts duties of justice owed collectively to persons into contractual 
obligations owed individually by persons. Debtor-creditor relationships tend to 
be unequal by their very nature and structure.6 Usually the debt underlying this 
imbalanced relationship is secured debt that can be over four times annual 
household income, such as the home mortgage.7 But if a family is excluded from 
the benefits of secured debt the result is the opposite: a credit-based society in 
which credit is a resource that contributes to inequalities.8 About 45 million 
Americans lack a credit score as of 2015, essentially excluding them from 
accessing credit.9 
The winners and losers that the law determines in a debt-for-well-being 
society can reproduce invidious forms of racial or other discrimination, causing 
grave injustice and substantial harm for many persons, families, and 
communities—harm that spans across generations. In the pre-civil rights era of 
the twentieth century, governments used law to block African-Americans from 
obtaining home mortgages by deeming them too risky and through a practice 
known as redlining—the exclusion of entire minority communities from 
mortgage credit.10 Governments have historically structured markets to achieve 
injustice with intergenerational consequences. 
Beyond the normative issues of fairness or justice in the credit system, some 
regulatory design is ineffective at producing even the most basic levels of 
consumer protection. As Part II of this Article explores, the primary mode of 
regulation in financial markets is disclosure. The problems with disclosure have 
mainly to do with cognition: the limited ability of persons to be able to use and 
process information to make informed lending decisions. Substantial evidence in 
repeat studies informs that mandatory disclosure fails to protect consumers.11 
Attempts to infuse more paternalistic structures into the debt contract risks 
increasing the costs of credit for lenders which may cause them to exit the credit 
 
 5.  Rachel E. Dwyer, Credit, Debt, and Inequality, 44 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 237, 245 (2018). 
 6.  Id. at 238. 
 7.  What is a debt-to-income ratio? Why is the 43% debt-to-income ratio important?, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-debt-to-income-ratio-why-is-
the-43-debt-to-income-ratio-important-en-1791/ [https://perma.cc/4EG2-TNVF]. 
 8.  See Dwyer, supra note 5, at 243 (“[S]ecured debt in a context of a weak welfare state enables 
households with modest means to build wealth over time, and exclusion from such opportunities 
contributes to inequalities in attainment and wealth accumulation.”). 
 9.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, DATA POINT: CREDIT INVISIBLES 15 (2015), https://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A9F-FQRL]. 
 10.  See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 16–17 (2017) (explaining the practice of red-lining and the 
discriminatory impact it had on black communities). 
 11.  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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market in areas where credit is needed most. Finance has a way of easily moving 
credit around to seek the higher returns and lower risk.12 
Call it the tragedy of contract. The core of debt is contract. A mix of 
normative and cognitive problems can lead to the dismal conclusion: it is very 
difficult to regulate access to credit in a way that both fairly distributes credit as 
a resource in a society, while also ensuring that debtors are respected as 
autonomous agents who avoid unsustainable levels of debt. Both these problems 
concern fairness. Regulating the terms of the debt contract has to do with 
transactional fairness, which is an attempt to make consumers assent to a contract 
that is psychologically sensible to persons. The distribution question concerns 
substantive fairness: access to credit is what John Rawls called a social primary 
good and leads to access to other social primary goods, requiring a fair 
distribution in a society along egalitarian lines.13 
Part II of this Article explores the cognitive limitations that people encounter 
in making credit decisions. Regulatory disclosure mandates are generally 
ineffective at improving the choices people make about debt. People do not read 
contracts and what they do read they often fail to understand. The contract 
model, which puts overwhelming cognitive demands on people, is preordained to 
fail. Creditors will not disclose what they do not have to, and they sometimes 
engage in psychological manipulation to entice people to take on debt. Part II 
also examines why more paternalistic attempts to regulate the actual terms and 
conditions of debt products are often ineffective.  
Part III explores the normative questions of why access to credit is an 
important social good in a society that creates access to other important social 
goods such as housing, education, and intergenerational well-being. The current 
framework, which denies that access to credit is an important social good, puts 
persons and households in a precarious and vulnerable position, fails to meet 
goals of well-understood theories of distributive justice, and leads to a denial of 
liberty for individuals in the form of domination by creditors. The conclusion is 
clear: either develop a set of tools to incorporate the values of equality into the 
consumer lending markets, or remove debt from the basic structure of society 
and eliminate its role as a social good that allocates well-being. Societies must be 
careful not to over-financialize their citizens.14 Financialization requires the 
recognition of justice as a priority for law and policy on access to credit. 
 
 12.  See KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND 
INEQUALITY 199 (2019) (“Spotting opportunities to make money on the hope of others is what 
intermediaries do, and their business is leveraging up in the expectation of future returns.”). 
 13.  See discussion  infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See generally GUIDO COMPARATO, THE FINANCIALISATION OF THE CITIZEN SOCIAL AND 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION THROUGH EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (2018) (discussing the concept of 
financialization). 
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II 
COGNITIVE DIFFICULTIES IN REGULATING THE DEBT CONTRACT 
This Part discusses the cognitive obstacles preventing humans from making 
good credit decisions. Though these cognitive obstacles are now well understood, 
legal scholars have offered little by way of policy prescriptions to work around 
them. The immediate reaction among many who want to protect weaker parties 
to debt contracts is to impose restrictions on lenders, but such moves risk 
restricting access to credit.15 This is not a solution in a world where access to credit 
is embedded in the basic structure of a society as necessary for household and 
intergenerational flourishing.16 Legal scholars and regulators appear to embrace 
a resigned attitude toward the situation and do not pursue bold solutions. Oren 
Bar Gill argues that the focus on disclosure mandates is not because it is always 
the “optimal form of regulatory intervention” but because it is the “least intrusive 
form of regulation and, thus, the form of regulation most likely to be adopted.”17 
We seem stuck in the tragedy of contract. This resignation appears to be at work 
in the private law for consumer contracts, in which conspicuous notice of contract 
terms is beginning to replace mutual assent as sufficient to form a contract 
online.18 
This failure to pursue bold strategies is a predictable outcome in the social 
science (as opposed to normative) approaches dominating legal scholarship. The 
analytical and empirical methods being used are suitable for identifying problems 
but not for furnishing a normative framework by which to evaluate and design 
regulation. We cannot ask social science to do much more than identify problems. 
The study of justice has become less important, often labeled as a question that 
 
 15.  See John Linarelli, Debt in Just Societies: A General Framework for Regulating Credit, 14 
REGUL. GOVERNANCE 409, 409 (2020) (“[A]ccess to credit is a ‘resource’ in many societies, which means 
that it is a primary method by which persons develop and implement plans for their lives.”). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN 
CONSUMER MARKETS 32 (2012). 
 18.  See Meyer v. Uber Tech. Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74–75  (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that an offeree is bound 
by an agreement regardless of actual notice to a term if the term if the term was clear and conspicuous 
enough that a reasonably prudent user would be on inquiry notice). On these issues is it worth reviewing 
the considerable debates around the Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts, which the 
American Law Institute completed in 2019. See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar & Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler, Searching for the Common Law: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of 
Consumer Contracts, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2017) (outlining the empirical approach taken to construct 
the Restatement of Consumer Contracts); Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the 
Restatement of Consumer Contract Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 45 (2019) (arguing that the new 
restatements coding has obscured the judgment calls necessary to properly code decisions and their 
persuasive power); Adam J. Levitin, Nancy S. Kim, Christina L. Kunz, Peter Linzer, Patricia A. McCoy, 
Juliet M. Moringiello, Elizabeth A. Renuart, & Lauren E. Willis, The Faulty Foundation of the Draft 
Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 447 (2019) (arguing that the coding of the 
restatement relied on irrelevant cases and thus does not adequately restate the law of contracts); Brian 
Wolfman, Opposition to the draft Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts, PUB. CITIZEN: 
CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 2, 2019), https://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2019/05/opposition-to-
the-draft-restatement-of-the-law-of-consumer-contracts.html [https://perma.cc/H6B4-3RWP] 
(endorsing Adam Levitin’s critique on the draft of the Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts). 
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is rhetorical or about personal opinion.19 As we shall discover in Part III below, 
fully developed theories about justice and equality could be put to use in 
evaluating financial regulation.20 For now, let us survey the current state of affairs 
on regulatory design for access to credit. 
A. The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 
Disclosure has been the approach of choice in attempting to solve the 
problems of fairness in consumer financial services. The seventy-third United 
States Congress “invented” disclosure and made the United States the first 
country to mandate disclosure in financial transactions. Various provisions in the 
Securities Act of 1933 regulated the issuance of new investment products known 
as securities, and provisions in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 regulated 
the sale of securities after initial issuance, in the secondary markets.21 Conversely, 
the United Kingdom did not take government regulation of financial services 
seriously until 1985, with the creation of the now long-defunct Securities and 
Investment Board.22 The 1933 and 1934 “Securities Acts” in the United States 
influenced the style and method for securities and financial regulation to follow 
in the United States and in other countries.23 
The 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts were not limited to consumer transactions, 
a concept that did not exist at the time. The core regulatory concept for American 
financial markets rests on disclosure, both in their regulation of securities issuers 
and in setting legal standards for suits to recover for various forms of fraud in the 
sale and purchase of securities. Substantial reasons support disclosure mandates 
 
 19.  See Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 933–34 
(2009). These arguments go back to Bentham. 
 20.  See discussion infra Part II. 
 21.  Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-209, 48 Stat. 881, 889 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78). 
 22.  See Sam Scott Miller, Regulating Financial Services in the United Kingdom—An American 
Perspective, 44 BUS. LAW. 323, 330, 336 (1989) (“The failure of several investment advisory and 
commodity firms following their misappropriation of customers’ funds earlier in the 1980’s created a call 
for new legislation.”). 
 23.  The European Union has also mandated a significant disclosure regime with which EU member 
states must comply. There have been a number of critiques on the EU’s over-reliance on disclosure. For 
critiques, see generally Ognyn Seizov et al., The Transparent Trap: A Multidisciplinary Perspective on the 
Design of Transparent Online Disclosures in the EU, 42 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 149 (2018) (arguing that a 
lack of guidance on how disclosures must be formulated leaves too much discretion to traders); Emilios 
Avgouleas, What Future for Disclosure as a Regulatory Technique? Lessons from Behavioural Decision 
Theory and the Global Financial Crisis, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 211 (Iain MacNeil 
& Justin O’Brien eds., Hart 2010) (arguing that disclosure will only be effective if in conjunction with 
supplemented with protected regulations); Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis and the 
Disclosure Paradigm in European Financial Regulation: The Case for Reform, 6 EUROPEAN CO. & FIN. 
L. REV. 440 (2009) (arguing that an independent financial products committee could be a better 
protection strategy then enhanced disclosure). In a related vein about sales law. See Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Oren Bar-Gill, Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of European Consumer 
Contract Law, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 109 (2013) (arguing that the Common European Sales Law 
will likely impede cross border trade, prevent consumers access cross markets and create disharmony in 
the member states’ laws). 
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for public securities markets, which go beyond the paternalism rationales 
associated with protection of purchasers of securities. These reasons have mainly 
to do with making markets more efficient by promoting the disclosure of 
information that institutional investors will incorporate into their valuations of 
securities. This argument finds its rationale in the efficient capital markets 
theories and in Friedrich Hayek’s The Use of Knowledge in Society.24 
While mandated disclosure for securities rests only partly on a consumer 
protection rationale, particularly the protection of individual investors, the 
rationale for mandated disclosure in consumer financial products is designed 
primarily to protect the consumer. The “protect the market” rationale has some 
force in the regulation of credit products, but less than it has in securities markets, 
as it cannot as reliably rest on the notion of rational transactors in credit markets 
as it can for securities markets, in which institutional investors are the main 
consumers of information. 
In consumer lending, a formidable patchwork of federal and state laws, 
starting with the Truth in Lending Act in 1968, mandate disclosure by lenders in 
some form to borrowers.25 This is particularly the case for mortgage lending, 
which connects to a primary source of wealth for many households in the United 
States and in other countries that promote individual homeownership. Current 
post-global financial crisis legislation in the United States mandating disclosure 
includes the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act26 for 
home mortgages and the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Disclosure (CARD) Act27 for credit cards, though these acts go further and 
engage in some product regulation.28 
Recent empirical research on online consumer contracts offers evidence that 
disclosure mandates fail because people do not read terms and conditions.29 The 
 
 24.  See generally Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 529 
(1945). 
 25.  Space prohibits listing them all here. See generally Anne Fleming, The Long History of “Truth 
in Lending”, 30 J. POL’Y HIST. 236 (2018) (outlining the history and development of mandatory disclosure 
rules); Kathleen C. Engel & Patrick A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of 
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (articulating the market structures that have incentivized 
private lending). 
 26.  See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 27.  See generally Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure (Credit CARD) Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734. 
 28.  See infra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 7 (2016) (“Mandated disclosure fails because it depends on a long chain of 
fragile links. It works only if three actors  – lawmakers, disclosures, and discloses – play demanding parts 
deftly.”); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More Than You Wanted to Know About the Failures of 
Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63, 63 (2015) (“Nobody reads fine print – even when it 
matters.”); Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine 
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (2014) (finding in their 
study that less than 1% of users actually read the licensing agreement when online shopping). See 
generally Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INST. & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 94 (2012) (arguing mandatory disclosure will not likely put competitive pressure on sellers); 
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evidence these studies have developed can be reasonably extended to contracting 
for credit, much of which now happens online.30 Many people have difficulties 
with financial literacy.31 And the argument that people who enter into online 
contracts are rationally ignorant rests on a by now well-understood false 
assumption that people are rational. There is now overwhelming evidence, in 
behavioral economics and in psychology and the behavioral sciences more 
generally, putting in deep suspicion the notion that we should rest policy law 
reform on a spurious conception of the person as rational.32 The main dissenter 
from the view that mandated disclosure fails is Oren Bar-Gill, who contends that 
product use disclosure, particularly disclosure of individual as opposed to 
statistically determined average uses of credit products, may be effective.33 Bar-
Gill’s work appears to apply to credit cards and other forms of revolving credits 
in which use patterns develop. 
Except perhaps for this limited case, mandated disclouse fails. 
But let us be clear on what mandated disclosure in consumer finance is meant 
to fix. It is meant to assist contract parties in positions of disparate bargaining 
power or at disparate levels of sophistication. Mandated disclosure is intended to 
support a person’s autonomy as a contract party. It has really nothing to do with 
distributive justice. Laws that protect the vulnerable or persons with little 
bargaining power are aimed at fairness in individual transactions. Distributive 
justice has a broader role, focusing not on the individual responsibility of the 
parties to each transaction but on the social responsibility members of a society 
have to structure their credit markets fairly. At best, if mandated disclosure 
works—a big “if”—it might accidently achieve some distributive justice. But we 
need methods more precisely designed to focus on distributive justice.  
 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Some Realities of Online Contracting, 19 S. CT. ECON. REV. 11 (2011) 
(discussing the policy implications of End User License Agreements); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. 
Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (arguing mandatory 
disclosure leads to unintended consequences and harms those it aims to protect). 
 30.  See Lauren Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory 
Lending: Pricing, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 727 (2006) (“The prices for their other products usually do not 
differ greatly and are made easily accessible to the applicant who wants to price shop, frequently though 
the newspaper or internet.”). 
 31.  See BAR-GILL, supra note 17, at 161 (“[M]any individuals are not well informed and 
knowledgeable about their terms of borrowing.”). For a survey, see Angelo Capuano & Ian Ramsey, 
Financial Literacy Project, What Causes Suboptimal Financial Behavior? An Exploration of Financial 
Literacy, Social Influences and Behavioral Economics (Univ. of Melbourne L. Sch., Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 540, 2011) https://ssrn.com/abstract=1793502 [https://perma.cc/QX62-C5JP]. 
 32.  See, e.g., Dan Ariely, The End of Rational Economics, HARV. BUS. REV., Jul.–Aug. 2009, at 78  
(criticizing the standard economic theory of rational actors). 
 33.  See BAR-GILL, supra note 17 at 14–15 (“‘[P]erfect knowledge of one’s preferences cannot simply 
be assumed.’ The central role of use levels as an object of misperception thus highlights the value of a 
behavioral-economics approach.”). 
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B. Why Product Regulation is Difficult 
Governmental regulation of credit products goes beyond disclosure. And 
sometimes these regulations exist in conjunction with mandated disclosure.34 For 
example, the CARD Act includes a number of provisions regulating credit card 
terms, including banning double cycle billing, allocating payments to the balance 
bearing the lowest interest rate first, automatically enrolling cardholders in over 
the limit programs, and forbidding activity fees and convenience fees.35 Under 
the CARD Act, penalty fees must be reasonable and proportional.36 It is 
important to frame these provisions as regulating the terms of products, rather 
than the terms of contracts, to signify that contract in its classical form is not really 
at work in the credit market. Rather than bargaining on a bespoke contract, 
borrowers are buying pre-determined terms and conditions, in the form of the 
adhesion contract.37 
There is some doubt that product regulation is effective. From the standpoint 
of economic theory, if regulation increases the cost of lending and reduces the 
return, lenders may move their money to more favorable rates of return. This is 
the theory, but we continue to learn that too many variables cast doubt on its 
simple logic. It does not account for the fact that consumer lending markets 
comprise a significant array of market opportunities in the United States; that 
lenders can structure transactions to mitigate or even eliminate risk through 
intermediation,38 which is subsidized in the home mortgage market; and that 
sometimes industry prefers regulation when it reduces risk and particularly when 
industry has influence over the regulatory process. 
Like mandated disclosure, product regulation fails to address issues of 
equality. It reflects a more paternalistic view of credit market regulation than 
mandated disclosure does. It rests on assumptions that people are boundedly 
rational and do not understand credit products even if disclosures are made. But 
it has nothing to do with equality or distributive justice in the credit markets. It 
has to do with the structure of transactions and not the structure of markets. 
III 
INTRODUCING EQUALITY INTO ACCESS TO CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
Much of the attention in access to credit and inequality has been to the 
invidious problem of racial discrimination in lending, particularly in mortgage 
 
 34.  E.g., The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act Rule, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.32 (defining and 
regulating the terms of high cost mortgages); see generally Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market 
Regulation, in BUILDING WEALTH: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 206 (Nicholas 
P. Restsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005) (outlining five different types of credit market policies). 
 35.  Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734, 1738, 1739, 1740, 1741, 1752 
 36.  Id. at 1740. 
 37.  See JANE MARGARET RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 31 (2014). 
 38.  See PISTOR, supra note 12 at 136 (describing how the intermediary approach enables the legal 
system of where the entity is incorporated to govern allowing entities to choose jurisdictions with more 
favorable laws). 
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lending.39 The Community Reinvestment Act was a substantial policy response 
mainly to racial inequality.40 But an assessment of the Community Reinvestment 
Act and the obvious moral wrongfulness of racist law and lending practices are 
beyond the scope of this article. My focus here, rather, is on income and wealth 
inequality. Some call these distinctions as between status and material inequality, 
with status referring to the characteristics of persons based on morally arbitrary 
categories such as race or ethnicity, and material inequality referring to income 
and wealth.41 Of course, some overlap between these categories exists in societies 
in which racial discrimination is practiced in lending. But inequality, apart from 
racially discriminatory practices, is a problem worth addressing in a just society, 
for economic, moral, and political reasons.42 
The focus of this Part is on equality from a moral point of view as morality 
applies to institutions. Why material inequality is objectionable is a big subject 
beyond the scope of this Article and more for a purely philosophical treatment. 
For our purposes, let us stipulate that law is a cooperative practice in which 
persons subject to it are in a relationship or association of reciprocity and for 
these reasons the law and other institutions in the society formed by this 
cooperative and associative practice, including financial institutions, should not 
cause or contribute to material inequality. This does not mean that inequality 
might be objectionable if it arises from desert or natural endowments. As lawyers, 
we deal in institutions, human-created social practices. The institutions we create 
are subject to our moral duties to fellow citizens to not promote inequality. 
Justice, a matter of moral concern in law and politics, comes first as a matter of 
priority in public policy. We can reach a consensus as to what it is on the basis of 
settled principles, and law can promote it, or not. The justice we are concerned 
with here is distributive justice, moral ideas about the distribution of burdens and 
benefits in a society. 
The goal of this Part is methodological ground clearing to begin to develop 
tools for evaluating access to credit issues. From the standpoint of distributive 
justice, this Part aims to assist in developing a toolkit to understand what law and 
economics calls distributional concerns. This toolkit will go beyond simply 
 
 39.  See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10; MEHRSA BADARASAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK 
BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP 115 (2019) (describing the how discrimination impeded lenders 
ability to provide mortgages to segregated black communities); THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, TOXIC 
INEQUALITY: HOW AMERICA’S WEALTH GAP DESTROYS MOBILITY, DEEPENS THE RACIAL DIVIDE, 
AND THREATENS OUR FUTURE (2017). 
 40.  See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 41.  See SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 213 (2019). 
 42.  On this very general point some philosophers and economists seem to agree though their reasons 
differ. See T.M. SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER (2018) (arguing that the value of equality 
is non-instrumental, arising from the value of equality itself); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF 
INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2013) (focusing on the 
importance of fairness and equality in the economy). The political problem associated with inequality, 
overlapping with moral problems, is domination by affluent groups and distortion of policy choices. See 
generally MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA (2012) (discussing how public preferences are both shaped by the elite and influence 
policy outcomes). 
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identifying the problem of distribution as a matter of social science empiricism 
and then seeking to solve the problem through common sense or personal 
preferences. 
Rather, the focus here is on Rawls’s theory of justice.43 This Article does not 
in any sense offer an exegetical treatment of Rawls, nor does it advocate a strict 
adherence to Rawlsian approaches. Since Rawls wrote what is probably the most 
important set of works in moral and political philosophy in the twentieth century, 
a post-Rawlsian corpus on egalitarianism has proliferated. Rawls provides an 
explicit scaffolding by which to understand why and in what circumstances 
institutions, including law, should be designed to comply with principles of 
justice. This scaffolding allows us to see clearly why law and other institutions 
relevant to consumer finance are subject to evaluation using principles of 
distributive justice. 
A. Consumer Finance as a Site for Distributive Justice 
The first question to ask is whether consumer finance is a site of distributive 
justice.44 Not all areas of financial regulation are.45 In Rawlsian terms, consumer 
finance is a site of justice if it is part of the “basic structure of society” and 
necessary for a person in a society to obtain “social primary goods.”46 It is 
unnecessary to hew closely to John Rawls’s work, but his conceptions are useful 
here for articulating a framework to evaluate consumer financial regulation. 
The basic structure of society is, according to Rawls, the “primary subject of 
justice,” comprised of institutions that distribute the main benefits and burdens 
in a society.47 The basic structure is “the way in which the major social institutions 
fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties 
and shape the division of advantages that arise through social cooperation.”48 It 
includes the “legally recognized forms of property, and the organization of the 
economy, and the nature of the family, all belong to the basic structure.”49 
According to Samuel Freeman, one of Rawls’s former students and a leading 
expositor of Rawls’s philosophy, the basic structure includes the law on “the 
structure of the economy, including control of means of production and, 
therewith, laws of property, contract, and other legal measures necessary for 
 
 43.  See  infra note 46–48 and accompanying text. 
 44.  For an introduction to the site of justice notion, see generally G.A. Cohen, Where the Action Is: 
On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1997), though I do not follow his argument. 
 45.  See generally Linarelli, supra note 15 (proposing the implementation of a luck egalitarian 
approach that takes equality into account while holding individuals responsible for their real choices). 
 46.  See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harv. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999); JOHN 
RAWLS: JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., Harv. Univ. Press 2d ed. 2001); JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Colum. Univ. Press Expanded Ed. 2005). 
 47.  RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 46 at 7–11, 15, 54, 84. 
 48.  RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 46 at 258. 
 49.  Id. 
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economic production, exchange, and consumption; and certain norms that apply 
to the family regarding the upbringing of children.”50 
In a Rawlsian framework, distributive justice is about how the basic structure 
of society distributes social primary goods. Social primary goods are those that 
are essential for a person to be free and equal in a society and to pursue a good 
life. Rawls identified “income and wealth” as examples of social primary goods.51 
Moreover, in a society placing high priority on the accumulation of wealth 
through private home ownership and the securing of public services through 
private means, income and wealth are also relevant to the achievement of other 
social primary goods such as the “social bases of self-respect” and freedom of 
movement and choice of occupation in the context of economic opportunity.52 
A broad interdisciplinary consensus has emerged that the institutions of 
access to credit are part of the basic structure of American society and that they 
distribute primary social goods. Recent sociological evidence supports these 
findings.53 The American market for credit has historically been substantially 
subsidized by the federal government.54 Legal scholars have gotten the point. 
Here are just a few select examples. According to Patricia McCoy, “the evidence 
shows that purchasing a home remains a powerful path – many would say the 
most powerful path – to building wealth for families of modest means.”55 Adam 
Levitin and Susan Wachter explain: 
It is hard to overstate the importance of housing finance in modern life and in the 
modern economy. The type of housing finance system we have determines our built 
environment and the nature and quality of our lives as individuals. It determines where 
and how we live. It determines who among us can become homeowners, and it 
determines what kind of houses, what kind of neighborhoods, and what kind of 
communities we live in. It even affects our ability to participate fully as citizens in our 
local communities.56 
Levitin and Wachter go on to explain the institution of the “American 
Mortgage,” the thirty-year fixed rate mortgage created in the New Deal, which 
only exists in the United States. The American Mortgage would not exist without 
government involvement. Access to credit provides homeowners with other 
social goods, besides homes that are essential to achieving distributive justice in 
a society, such as access to good schools, a clean environment, and low-crime 
 
 50.  SAMUEL FREEMAN, LIBERALISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 231 (2018). 
 51.  See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 46 at 181. 
 52.  RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 46 at 58–59. 
 53.  See Dwyer, supra note 5 at 239 (“Three principal approaches have emerged in research on credit 
and debt that connect to strong traditions of research on inequality: credit and debt in shaping social 
inclusion and exclusion, the influence of credit and debt on life chances, and credit and debt as elements 
of opressive social relations.”). See generally QUINN, supra note 2 (arguing that increasing access to credit 
may be more effective in providing citizens with means to acquire basic needs than government funded 
social aid programs). 
 54.  QUINN, supra note 2. 
 55.  Patricia A. McCoy, Has the Mortgage Pendulum Swung Too Far? Reviving Access to Mortgage 
Credit, 37 B.C. J. L. SOC. JUST. 213, 214 (2017). 
 56.  ADAM J. LEVITIN & SUSAN M. WACHTER, THE GREAT AMERICAN HOUSING BUBBLE: WHAT 
WENT WRONG AND HOW WE CAN PROTECT OURSELVES IN THE FUTURE 1 (2020). 
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communities.57 These social goods could be delinked from access to credit for 
homeownership through de-financialization. Other societies are so organized.58 
But we have to deal with the realities of our society if we want our theorizing to 
be realistic. 
Yet still, popular mischaracterizations continue to circulate that housing 
markets, the housing finance market, and more generally the consumer finance 
market, somehow operate on their own and only occasionally require 
government intervention. This is really an ideological narrative, or perhaps it is a 
misunderstanding of what political scientist Suzanne Mettler calls the submerged 
state, which underlies the contracts at work in financial markets.59 The disclosure 
versus product regulation dichotomy reflects this ideology of intervention. The 
intervention language is not helpful for understanding what is really happening 
in these markets. Law does not intervene in financial markets. Law constitutes 
financial markets.60 Except in some boundary circumstances, markets are just a 
“bunch of rules.”61 
If we adhere to the false narrative of naturally occurring markets in need of 
occasional intervention, we risk classifying barriers to access to credit as a matter 
for corrective justice—to correct particular cases of discrimination in lending on 
an individual basis. Discrimination has been a serious problem in consumer 
finance but there are also significant structural problems that need to be 
addressed, including but not limited to structural racism. A focus on isolated 
transactions is not enough. It is possible to have a mortgage transaction entirely 
free of discrimination yet still problematic from a structural point of view. A full 
accounting for justice is not simply about prohibiting denials of credit to 
individuals, but about how the law shapes the market for credit, with a focus on 
who gets it and who does not and why, even if individual lenders engage in no 
discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity or any other factor. 
 
 57.  Linarelli, supra note 15, at 412. 
 58.  C.f. Leo Kaas, Georgi Kocharov, Edgar Preugschat & Nawid Siassi, Reasons for the low 
homeownership rate in Germany, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK: RESEARCH BRIEF (Jan. 14, 2020), https:// 
www.bundesbank.de/en/publications/research/research-brief/2020-30-homeownership-822176 [https:// 
perma.cc/59UY-8DVR] (explaining how Germany’s housing policies incentivize renting). 
 59.  Mettler, supra note 1. 
 60.  Pistor, supra note 12. 
 61.  Robert Reich puts it succinctly: 
[T]he “free market” is a bunch of rules about (1) what can be owned and traded (the genome? 
slaves? nuclear materials? babies? votes?); (2) on what terms (equal access to the internet? the 
right to organize unions? corporate monopolies? the length of patent protections? ); (3) under 
what conditions (poisonous drugs? unsafe foods? deceptive Ponzi schemes? uninsured 
derivatives? dangerous workplaces?) (4) what’s private and what’s public (police? roads? clean 
air and clean water? healthcare? good schools? parks and playgrounds?); (5) how to pay for 
what (taxes, user fees, individual pricing?). And so on.  
  These rules don’t exist in nature; they are human creations. Governments don’t “intrude” 
on free markets; governments organize and maintain them. Markets aren’t “free” of rules; the 
rules define them. 
Robert Reich, The Myth of the “Free Market” and How to Make the Economy Work for Us, ROBERT 
REICH (Sept. 16, 2013),  https://robertreich.org/post/61406074983 [https://perma.cc/JWH9-FL6H]. 
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B. Principles of Distributive Justice for Consumer Finance 
Having argued that principles of distributive justice have a role in the 
structuring of consumer finance, the next question is: what are the principles? 
How do we know when access to credit is good or bad from a distributional point 
of view? Of course, a number of financial measures are used to evaluate access 
to credit: credit scores, ability to pay requirements, loan to value ratios for 
mortgages, loan to income ratios for mortgages, and so on. But these have to do 
with finance and with individual loan applications and not with equality in the 
distribution of credit opportunities. When it comes to understanding what it 
means to say, “this kind of inequality in the credit system is wrong,” how do we 
answer, in terms of methodology and shared consensus on values? We tend to 
base our views on access to credit on what we feel is right, but this is not good 
enough for policy making because it fails to offer a route to a consensus. 
Lawmakers and regulators will not take equality seriously without a methodology 
for assessing it. 
The current prevalent approach to regulatory evaluation is cost benefit 
analysis. Not all financial regulation is evaluated using explicit application of cost 
benefit analysis, but it can come into regulation implicitly because some 
regulators will apply it conceptually in the exercise of expert judgment.62 One 
significant problem for cost benefit analysis is the interpersonal aggregation 
problem: it aggregates costs and benefits across everyone regardless of their luck, 
circumstances, position in society, historic injustice, and so on. Interpersonal 
aggregation is morally problematic because small benefits of a regulation 
accruing to large numbers of people can be permissibly aggregated to outweigh 
disproportionate burdens imposed on a lower number of particular persons.  Let 
us assume that there are two benefits to access to credit, one direct and the other 
indirect. The direct benefit is access to credit itself. The indirect benefit is 
stability—the idea that lending should not endanger the economy by imposing 
externalities in the form of systemic risk on everyone. Conceptually, cost benefit 
analysis without appropriate modification—assuming it can be modified without 
jeopardizing its validity—is entirely insensitive to inequality. In theory, we could 
design a very stable credit market by cutting out the poor or even a good chunk 
of the middle class entirely. Cost benefit analysis could permit access to credit 
institutions that would prohibit all mortgage lending to anyone that earns an 
income of less than $250,000 if it maximized both direct and indirect benefits. We 
would likely have a very stable financial system if we cut the poor and most of 
the middle class out of the credit markets. But given the way American society 
pegs wealth to access at least to mortgage credit, this approach would be very 
unjust. The point I make here is simply that the current tools to evaluate financial 
regulation are insensitive to inequality. I do not argue this set of facts is true but 
 
 62.  For recent discussions, see generally John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial 
Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015) (discussing cost benefit analysis of 
financial regulation). 
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only that it would be a sound result for cost benefit analysis if the numbers hold. 
Not all harms are equal if we take distributive justice into account. 
There is evidence that the failure to take equality into account in post-
financial crisis regulation of mortgage lending continues to have adverse effects 
on lower-income households. A study by Laurie Goodman of the Urban 
Institute, for example, informs that the current rules impose substantial and 
disproportionate burdens on the less well-off to maintain stability in the financial 
system.63 Goodman has found that mortgage credit has tightened up considerably 
since the financial crisis. According to Goodman “[m]any loans are not being 
made that should be.”64 There has been a decline in home ownership in the 
United States and a shrinkage of credit.65 We need the methodological toolkit to 
evaluate these findings to get at “distributional concerns” beyond facile 
descriptions. 
Two principles of justice can be deployed to evaluate access to credit 
institutions. One well-understood moral principle relevant to law and public 
policy is the difference principle: an institution such as a statute or regulation that 
creates or perpetuates inequality is morally permissible (or at least not morally 
wrong) if it makes persons who are less well-off better off.66 The difference 
principle can be understood as a priority for those who are worse off. 
One way to develop a method to put into play a priority for the worse off is 
through what philosopher Frances Kamm calls pairwise comparisons.67 In 
evaluating any law or policy on access to credit, one compares individuals, one at 
a time, to see how worse or better off they would be with the law or policy.68 This 
may seem a daunting task, but in a time of big data, algorithmic decision tools, 
and lots of demographic data at hand, pairwise comparison methods should be 
feasible. The individualist restriction could be somewhat relaxed in the financial 
context, as like individuals and households often share like circumstances. 
With the moral idea of a priority for the worse off implemented in pairwise 
comparisons, relatively low net worth households have standing to object to 
mortgage lending policies that place undue burdens on their access to mortgages. 
What constitutes an undue burden is open to debate, though the argument that 
access to credit and overall financial stability are tradeoffs is now thoroughly 
 
 63.  Laurie S. Goodman, Quantifying the Tightness of Mortgage Credit and Assessing Policy Actions, 
37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 235 (2017). 
 64.  Id. at 238. 
 65.  See id. at 239–40 (“[L]ow credit borrowers make up a shrinking share of a shrinking bucket.”); 
Jonathan Spader & Christopher Herbert, Waiting for Homeownership: Assessing the Future of 
Homeownership, 2015-2035, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 267 (2017) (“In the face of the decade-long decline 
in homeownership, considerable uncertainty continues to exist about both the factors that have 
contributed to the decline and the homeownership rate’s future trajectory.”). 
 66.  I have not hewed closely to Rawls’s formulation. As I have said, I do not owe strict allegiance 
to Rawls. 
 67.  FRANCES M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PERMISSIBLE 
HARM 57 (2007). 
 68.  Id. 
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debunked.69 We are not dealing with cheap credit or irresponsible, risky lending 
here. Stability problems can be mitigated through appropriate measures above 
the level of retail finance, in the intermediation market. The burdens on lower 
income households caused by restrictions on access to credit include a diminished 
net worth, a decline in intergenerational flourishing, limited ability to place 
children in adequate schools, and so on. Higher income households benefit little 
from access to credit reform. They tend to be less leveraged and with little 
mortgage debt. Higher net worth households have diversified portfolios and are 
usually able to bear risk relatively well compared to lower net worth households. 
Higher income households tend to be, in essence, savers who invest in the 
mortgage debt of lower income households and therefore often benefit from 
access to credit.70 
The above sketch of an approach is not cost benefit analysis. It accords with 
what in philosophy is known as the separateness of persons requirement or the 
individualist restriction.71 Pairwise comparison requires that each individual be 
compared to each other individual. That we might make the analysis more 
tractable by comparing archetypes or representative individuals should hardly 
matter in the lending context. 
Another principle of justice that could be put to work in evaluating access to 
credit institutions is the fair equality of opportunity principle, which provides that 
persons with the same natural endowments and willingness to use them should 
have the same economic opportunities regardless of whether they are rich or 
poor. Low income cannot determine, on a moral basis, whether a person enjoys 
the benefits of access to credit, nor, if access to credit is a social primary good, 
can it restrict homeownership. Equality of opportunity is no doubt at work in 
many policy approaches aimed at access to credit. The claim for fair equality of 
opportunity could be more clearly articulated, perhaps to apply more clearly to 
all forms of inequality, to include material inequality. 
Finally, anticipating dubious arguments that this Article advocates socialism 
for credit institutions, it does nothing of the sort. If anything, the effect of these 
measures to improve equality in the credit system would be to promote what 
Rawls called a property owning democracy: a pro-market, pro-private ownership 
approach requiring widespread and dispersed ownership of property and capital 
and not concentrated interests, so as to avoid situations of domination that will 
distort democratic processes. The ideas in this Article align closely to New Deal 
 
 69.  Access to credit can be designed so that lower income households have access to credit without 
threatening financial stability. This is not about cheap credit or irresponsible lending. The claim that the 
last housing bubble was in some measure caused by easy lending incentivized by the Community 
Reinvestment Act has been thoroughly refuted. See Neil Bhutta & Daniel Ringo, Assessing the 
Community Reinvestment Act’s Role in the Financial Crisis, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RSRV. SYS. 
(May 26, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015/assessing-the-comm  
unity-reinvestment-acts-role-in-the-financial-crisis-20150526.html [https://perma.cc/YW8V-ESKA]. 
 70.  ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT 
RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 50, 54–55 (2014). 
 71.  Kamm, supra note 67. 
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policy values that have formed the basis for much of the American basic structure 
of society, but which are being demolished today. If we do not undertake the 
policy innovations sketched out in this article, we risk aggravating inequality even 
more. The result will not be a priority for the worse off but rather one for the 
better off, a wrong direction that inverts the social contract. This inversion 
converts public duties of justice owed to individuals to private duties of contract 
owed by individuals, aggravating power and domination dynamics in a society 
and worsening inequality and its deleterious effects. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
At best, we are in the nascent stages of developing methods for evaluating access 
to credit from the standpoint of equality. What is on offer here is mainly an 
attempt to clarify what should be valued in institutional reform. From the 
standpoint of institutional change, we have only started the work on status 
inequality and have done next to nothing about material inequality. Discussions 
of inequality sometimes produce a more radical approach of suggesting a more 
significant restructuring of housing and other markets to “de-financialize” the 
citizen. Here I make a modest plea to work internally and to leave the basic 
structure of private home ownership and private credit intact. Justice is a first 
priority for a society and its law. Tackling inequality is one of the most important 
social goals for our time and it requires a focus on how we distribute credit in 
American society. 
